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INTRODUCTION 
The structure of ethnic group relations in Canada and Quebec increases significantly the 
likelihood of violent conflict should Quebec vote to secede at any future referendum. 
This structural imperative is compounded by the probable demands for partition in the 
event separation becomes likely, as well as the inherent limitations of conflict 
management processes once violent ethnic conflict has broken out. Even if a future 
referendum produces another "no" vote, the potential for a recurrence of constitutional 
breakdown and renewed pressure for Quebec separation will remain. This article will first 
analyze the facets of the ethnic makeup of Quebec and Canada that weaken the potential 
for compromise and encourage violent conflict. Next, an analysis of the impact of 
separation processes will be undertaken showing how these forces might encourage 
violence and make violent conflict less manageable. Yet there are a number of forces, 
including, ironically, other aspects of ethnic group structure in Canada, that may help 
prevent violence from getting out of control and for reaching accommodation. These 
issues will be addressed in the final section of the article.  
STRUCTURES OF CONFLICT 
Patterns and Consequences of Structural Bicommunalism in Canada  
The overarching bicommunal structure of ethnic group relations in Canada intensifies the 
conflict between francophone Quebec and the rest of Canada and makes accommodation 
more difficult. The term "bicommunal" refers to societies where two principle ethnic 
groups predominate.1 The key point about bicommunal societies is that compromise and 
accommodation are especially difficult to achieve. Even where the two predominant 
groups constitute a kind of overlay as in Canada, where numerous subgroups also exist, 
the problems of bicommunalism may still occur.2 With just two groups coalition shifts 
become difficult; conversely, where numerous groups exist policy tradeoffs and coalition 
shifts become less problematic. If several groups share power, it may be possible to make 
less glaring compromises or even to hide losses to each group behind more complex 
plans. Central political authorities can more easily resist the demands of any one group, 
in part by playing off one group against the other and allowing each group to be a part of 
winning coalitions on particular issues. The classic example is India where, despite huge 
problems of ethnic diversity, lack of economic resources, and system-threatening 
conflicts, the political leadership has managed to hold the country together.3  
However, when just two groups predominate, the psychology of conflict may become 
more pronounced and more difficult to mediate.4 Policy issues are more likely to be 
perceived as a zero-sum game where one side wins and the other loses. The starkness of 
policy differences is especially acute when there are disagreements about constitutional 
issues. Constitutional compromises may be particularly difficult to achieve, because 
leaders will be less likely to bargain and implement changes behind closed doors. When 
contentious issues become public, success may be more difficult to achieve. In the 
difficult arena of ethnic relationships a public fight may benefit the more radical 
politicians and undermine a more moderate spirit of compromise. The public debate and 
open choice of Canada's electorate on the question of "distinct society" status for Quebec 
was a major complicating facet in the failure of the Meech Lake constitutional accord and 
the contemporary alienation of voters.5 Naturally, a case can be made that these issues 
should be open and decided by the electorate, and there were other key issues in the 
failure of the Meech Lake accord such as the involvement of Native groups. But the 
overriding question was the constitutional relationship between Quebec as a majority 
francophone province and the rest of Canada. The predominant issue and the 
predominant overarching groups in Canada reflect fundamental problems of 
bicommunalism.6 Thus far conflict has been largely nonviolent. In political systems 
where violent conflict between the two groups has broken out, feelings of hostility 
between the two communities may be particularly intense because of the existence of just 
one protagonist group.  
Where bicommunal social structure is reflected in a country's constitutional 
arrangements, the minority community may feel protected, and efforts to make 
constitutional changes may threaten the minority's sense of security and their sense that 
the political system is legitimate. The fear and anger produced by the patriation of the 
Canadian constitution in 1982 is a fundamental source of separatist sentiment in Quebec. 
Quebec's francophones see themselves as equal, founding partners of the Canadian 
federation, and many of Quebec's francophones felt that the 1982 constitutional changes 
significantly eroded their status and powers and threatened their survival as a people.7 
The Canadian Supreme Court, for example, acquired increased powers, and other groups, 
such as women and Native populations, were explicitly recognized.8 Quebec's 
francophones, especially the intelligentsia and many members of the political elite, were 
also offended by the process of patriating the Constitution, which was approved despite 
Quebec's objections. The merits of the arguments on both sides will not be dealt with 
here. The point is merely to indicate that, especially from the viewpoint of Quebec's 
sovereigntist leaders and intellectuals, the constitutional changes of 1982 were a direct 
and illegitimate challenge not just to their dignity but to their survival.  
To be sure, there is no question that Canada as a whole has become much more pluralistic 
in recent decades.9 Immigration has led, for example, to a dramatic decline in the 
percentage of citizens with British ancestry. The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms specifically acknowledges the multicultural character of Canada.10 This 
increased pluralism, especially in the provinces west of Quebec, has produced significant 
resentment toward the idea that Canada is bicommunal and that the francophones of 
Quebec are entitled to special consideration. The demands of Native groups have also 
become a major component of the politics of Canada and Quebec. In brief, although the 
predominant political issue and the overarching political division can be viewed as 
bicommunal, demographic and political changes have eroded the willingness of Canada's 
anglophones, allophones (native language other than English or French) and Natives to 
continue viewing the process from this perspective. The tension between the bicommunal 
and emerging multicultural aspects of Canadian society and politics are at the root of the 
current threat to Canada's survival as a country. Many of Quebec's francophone 
nationalists see the emphasis on multiculturalism as a direct and intentional challenge to 
the dualistic view of the Canadian state and thus to their ability to preserve and control 
their own destiny.  
Further complicating the ability of the system to manage bicommunal tensions is the 
system of federalism. Whatever the merits and necessity of a federal structure from the 
standpoint of beginning and building a nation, representing diverse interests over great 
distances and other positive attributes, the federal structure of Canada's political system 
greatly impedes the ability of national leaders to reach bargains concerning the overlying 
bicommunal division. Indeed, federalism can encourage provincial leaders to exploit the 
underlying tension between multiculturalism and bicommunalism, a process that 
accelerates and intensifies separatist sentiment in Quebec. Especially in the West, 
regional elites are responsive to electorates greatly removed from both the historical and 
contemporary issues of anglophone/francophone relations. As Reform Party strategy in 
the 1997 federal election campaign suggests, it can be to the short- run political 
advantage of regional elites to play the ethnic card, disparaging the notion of Canada as a 
bicommunal political system. In sum, the changing nature of overall ethnic group 
structure as well as the system of federalism have exacerbated the normal tensions of 
bicommunal politics.  
Dual Majority/Dual Minority Status within Quebec  
Both the francophone and anglophone communities in Quebec are simultaneously 
majority and minority groups.11 This has profound implications for group psychology, 
causing each group to feel the entitlements of the majority while possessing the 
insecurities of a minority. Where a majority has been conquered by military force or is 
dominated by a minority through technological or economic superiority, the likelihood of 
eventual rebellion is nearly certain except in cases of overwhelming power. The case of 
South Africa is particularly instructive in this regard. Although anglophone dominance in 
Quebec was never complete nor wholly exploitive, there was certainly some economic 
and even cultural control. Arguments that Quebec could be viewed as an exploited colony 
prior to the Quiet Revolution have been exaggerated.12 There existed a symbiotic 
relationship between francophone political and social elites on the one hand and 
anglophone economic elites on the other.13 Furthermore, the anglophone community of 
Quebec contributed in many ways to the economic, cultural and medical development of 
Quebec to the benefit of all its citizens. Nevertheless, perceived dominance by a minority 
produces a particularly intense assertiveness for power by the majority. The size of the 
francophone majority of Quebec, today standing at about 83 percent of the population, 
partly explains the determination and intensity of the drive for political, economic and 
social control since the Quiet Revolution began in 1960.  
But the francophones of Quebec are a distinct minority in Canada as a whole and fear that 
the massive anglophone environment surrounding them could swamp their language and 
culture. The francophones of Quebec exist not only as a minority within Canada but as a 
much smaller minority within the anglophone community of the United States and 
Canada combined. Of particular importance is the declining percentage of the population 
of Quebec within Canada as well as the declining percentage of Canadian francophones 
within Canada as a whole. These figures are now each below the symbolically important 
level of 25 percent and add to the sense of urgency in securing the future of the French 
language and culture of Quebec. The low birthrate of Quebec's francophones and 
immigration to Quebec create a heightened sense of demographic insecurities.14 To be 
sure, the requirement that most immigrants send their children to francophone schools as 
well as other language legislation has undoubtedly slowed the erosion of the use of 
French in the home and expanded its use in the workplace, but many francophones 
nevertheless feel threatened by demographic trends and the growing use of English 
internationally. The degree to which the French language is really threatened is, of 
course, subject to considerable debate, but the point is that the perception of threat is a 
powerful stimulant to Quebec nationalism.15  
English language media and business are a major force in Quebec's cultural life. 
Although Quebec law requires that Quebec's radio stations maintain a high level of 
French language content, American and other anglophone musicians are quite popular 
and are heard frequently on French language radio stations. The programming on English 
language television is also popular among many francophones. The technological and 
informational networks developing internationally also challenge the long-term survival 
of the French language. Computer programs, for example, are often available only in 
English.16  
The insecurities of Quebec's francophones are also heightened by the treatment that 
francophone minorities have received in Canada's other provinces. Approximately one 
million francophones live outside Quebec, the most politically significant of whom are 
the francophones of New Brunswick. Particularly resented was the treatment of 
francophone minorities in such places as Manitoba and the continuing difficulty of 
francophone minorities to obtain education and other services in their language. Although 
some of the political and economic circumstances of these communities have improved 
significantly in recent years owing to various federal programs and, in New Brunswick, 
constitutional protections, instances of discrimination have created a perception of ill-will 
by Canada's English-speaking majority toward francophones.17 Ironically, the Quebec 
government has provided little support to francophones living outside Quebec, partly 
because it does not want its policies toward Quebec's minorities subject to additional 
federal constraints.  
Motivated both by fears concerning the survival of the French language and culture as 
well as a belief that the majority has a right to control the internal politics of Quebec, 
both the Liberal Party of Quebec and sovereigntist Parti Québécois have passed and 
implemented stringent language and education policies designed to protect and support 
the development of the French language and culture. At present virtually all foreign 
immigrants to Quebec must send their children to French schools. Quebec Bill 101 
(Charter of the French Language) required even anglophone immigrants from the rest of 
Canada to send their children to French schools, although this provision was overturned 
by the Canadian Supreme Court in 1984. Bill 178, revoked by the Quebec government in 
1993 (Bill 86), prevented anglophone establishments from displaying signs in English. 
These measures, as well as various language enforcement policies, have created great 
resentment in the English-speaking community and led to an exodus of anglophone 
residents as well as some business.18  
The francophones of Quebec emphasize that they are not like other ethnic groups in 
Canadian society and regard themselves as a people with an historical homeland having 
its own institutions.19 It is not unusual where democracies contain regionally based ethnic 
groups for the members of these groups to have dual loyalties as, for example, in the case 
of Scotland and Wales, where inhabitants typically have feelings of loyalty to their 
homeland as well as their country, the United Kingdom.20 Such feelings of dual loyalty 
have in the past been typical among francophones who viewed their motherland or nation 
as Quebec and their country as Canada.21 After the constitutional crises of recent years 
within Canada and contention over issues such as language policy within Quebec, these 
dual loyalties have eroded. Indeed, some scholars argue that relationships are now largely 
devoid of affective content and that it is pragmatic economic considerations that will 
determine future relationships.22 Francophone ethnic identity has developed into full-
fledged nationalism based upon the preservation of francophone culture within the 
Quebec homeland.  
Of course, the emphasis upon the preservation of the French language and culture has 
made problematic the effort to obtain the support of Quebec's anglophone and allophone 
minorities.23 The claim that the separatist movement is based on a liberal democratic 
notion of individual and group rights rings hollow to most of Quebec's ethnic minorities. 
Many of these groups have a positive affinity for Canada and see nothing but risk in 
sovereignty for Quebec. Because Quebec nationalism is based primarily on the French 
dimension of the province, it has little to offer from the point of view of most of Quebec's 
minorities.24 An analysis of pre-referendum opinion poll data by Maurice Pinard shows a 
similarity of poll results among these groups; an average of only 8.7 percent of Quebec's 
anglophones and allophones preferred the sovereignty option. It is probable that the 
preference against sovereignty was particularly pronounced among anglophones but that 
even among allophones there was probably no more than 10 percent in favor of the "yes" 
position.25 Members of Quebec's Native communities voted 90 percent against 
sovereignty in the referendum, with even French-speaking Native communities voting no 
more than 25 percent "yes."26 So pronounced is the lack of support for sovereignty 
among Quebec's minorities that they can be together considered as a relatively cohesive 
counter group to Quebec's francophones.  
In other words, from the perspective of Quebec's overwhelmingly predominant political 
issue, Quebec can be considered as a bicommunal society with francophones on one side 
and virtually all other ethnic groups on the other. This is not to say that there exist no 
significant divisions within the two political groupings. Like Native groups, allophone 
communities often have a strong sense of community identity and group interests. Also, 
the francophone community includes recent immigrants as well as citizens with British 
Isles ancestry, and there are significant historical and contemporary ties to Native groups 
and others.27 Additionally, a significant number of francophones prefer to remain within 
Canada, and many of Quebec's francophones hold key jobs in the federal government 
including the positions of prime minister, cabinet minister and many others. Furthermore, 
some of the support among francophones for the "yes" position in the referendum was 
probably based on a misperception of the ballot question. Many "yes" voters believed that 
they were not voting for separation but rather for continued close ties under a sovereignty 
association relationship.28  
Yet being citizens of Quebec is a core part of the identity of most francophones and 
evokes powerful sentiments of pride and loyalty. Quebec's minorities understand the 
strength of francophone national identity within Quebec and are greatly concerned about 
their rights and cultural survival if Quebec separates from Canada. In power, large 
majorities are likely to be intolerant toward minorities, and there is little question that 
both francophones of Quebec and anglophones in the rest of Canada have sometimes 
treated the other group badly. However, the greater cultural cohesiveness and larger 
numerical predominance of the francophone culture of Quebec compared with the 
anglophones of Canada suggests a potential serious problem for minorities if Quebec 
separates. Of course, as noted above there is some social division within the francophone 
community, and many francophone politicians of both major Quebec parties as well as 
many francophone leaders of business, educational and cultural institutions are 
committed to the protection of Quebec's minorities.29 Nevertheless, the size and relative 
cohesiveness of francophone culture heighten the fears of Quebec's minorities that they 
would be subject to discrimination in a sovereign Quebec. In brief, Quebec is less 
pluralistic than the rest of Canada; francophones have an overwhelming numerical 
advantage and have pursued aggressively defensive language and educational policies.  
Moreover, the anglophones and most allophones of Quebec perceive themselves as part 
of the national majority. A key element of their strong resistance to the idea of Quebec 
sovereignty is a positive sense of being Canadian. There is often disagreement 
concerning the degree to which the anglophones of Quebec in the past have perceived 
themselves to be a distinct minority group  anglophone Quebecers  rather than merely a 
part of the broader anglophone community in Canada. After the Quiet Revolution and the 
imposition of stringent language and educational regualtions, a sense of being an 
oppressed minority within the new Quebec emerged.30 It should be added that the anger 
of anglophones, especially those with British Isles ancestry, toward Quebec nationalism 
has undoubtedly been heightened as a result of the psychological shift from dominant 
elite status to being a threatened minority.  
In sum, Quebec's two principle groups are strongly motivated both by their minority and 
majority status. These conditions contribute to intense insecurities as well as a sense of 
entitlement and complicates the search for accommodation. For anglophones and most 
allophones there are clear and powerful incentives to remain with the rest of Canada, 
where they would be a part of pluralistic majority. Part of this desire is motivated by 
strong feelings of political attachment and part by the fear of the economic consequences 
of Quebec independence. There is also a pronounced fear that the historic rights and 
privileges of the English-speaking community would be seriously undermined in a state 
with a huge francophone majority that has as the center of its raison d'être its French 
language and culture. Quebec's Native groups, although not part of the national majority 
and only about one percent of Quebec's population, control key territories, especially in 
the north, and see themselves as similarly threatened in an independent Quebec.  
CIRCUMSTANCES ENCOURAGING VIOLENCE AND 
COMPLICATING ITS RESOLUTION 
To many observers the idea of widespread communal and terrorist violence surrounding 
the secession of Quebec seems intuitively far-fetched. It is sometimes noted, for example, 
that after a close defeat in October 1995, pro-sovereigntists did not resort to violence. But 
this argument is of limited import as the status quo did not change, and there would 
always be hope of a future success. Indeed, many sovereigntists became convinced that 
eventual success was inevitable. Some writers have suggested that the idea of major 
violence in Canada is unrealistic.31 These individuals are often thoughtful scholars or 
practitioners who specialize in Canadian affairs rather than on issues of ethnic conflict 
and the processes of political violence. They are certainly correct that Quebec, for a 
variety of reasons, will never become another Bosnia, but they underrate the potential for 
other forms of very serious violence, including conflict between security forces as well as 
long-term, low-intensity guerilla and communal warfare.  
A referendum "yes" vote would mean the probable destruction of Canada and an 
immediate perceived threat to the security of Quebec's minorities. Pressures resulting 
from moves to partition Quebec as well as stresses concerning the economic and 
administrative terms of separation, including whether secession was to be permitted 
without political, legal or other challenge, would threaten and anger francophones. 
Extreme emotional forces could be unleashed after a "yes" vote, and their peaceful 
containment should not be assumed.  
There is far greater potential for both planned and unplanned violence over the separation 
of Quebec than most observers may realize, and it is inevitable that large-scale police or 
military intervention would have to take place except in all but minor disturbances.32 
Leaders of government and of the security forces would have no choice but to intervene 
in an effort to prevent more widespread violence. Yet, as will be discussed, such 
intervention is likely to produce escalation.  
It should also be emphasized that in spite of its strong democratic political culture, 
Canada, like most democracies, also has experienced violence in its historical 
development, although much less than in societies such as the United States. Subject to 
various interpretations, the Rebellion of 1837-38 in Lower Canada constitutes an 
important event in the psychology of francophone nationalists. There is an 
understandable pride in the challenge to authority believed to be illegitimate, whether this 
authority is viewed as anti-colonial, upper class or in other terms.33 Violence surrounding 
the revolts of the Métis as well as the disturbances surrounding conscription might also 
be noted. The violence perpetrated by the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) is the 
most important recent illustration of this phenomenon, including bombings, and to a 
much lesser extent kidnapping and assassination among its techniques.34 It is instructive 
that the FLQ was popular among some francophone college students and intellectuals 
during the bombing campaigns of the 1960s. It is, of course, true that FLQ violence was 
comparatively tame by international standards and that the group did not have widespread 
public support. There was widespread condemnation of the assassination of the Quebec 
Labour Minister, Pierre Laporte. Yet the point is precisely that this relatively narrow and 
mild conspiracy had enormously destabilizing consequences that suggest a potential for 
such events to get out of hand given a higher level of violence by communal/terrorist 
organizations and the security forces of whatever side. Support for violent organizations 
by a minority of people on both sides could be anticipated in the event of significant 
official or communal violence.  
It is sometimes argued that democracies do not go to war with one another, and Canada 
and Quebec are certainly democracies. Often referred to as the "democratic peace 
theory," this idea can be carried to the extreme viewpoint that the chance of war between 
democratic political systems is so remote as to be negligible, no matter what the 
circumstances. There are, however, significant statistical and methodological problems 
with this viewpoint.35 Positive examples of peaceful separation such as Czechoslovakia 
and Norway are sometimes cited as indicating the probability of peaceful secession. A 
problem with these comparisons is that there are inevitably key differences from the 
Canadian case.36 Additionally, there are obviously too few cases to develop meaningful 
conclusions concerning any general peacefulness of secession in democracies.  
Ethnic sensitivities, entitlements and grievances provide intense fuel for emerging 
conflicts. In other forms of political conflict, such as levels of funding for medical care 
and unemployment benefits, issues may be more easily compromised. Where the issue is 
fundamental identity, such as what country one belongs to, compromise can be difficult if 
not impossible. Where there is a breakup of a country, nationalistic passions can be 
inflamed beyond the point of self-restraint among many partisans.  
Ethnic and national feelings represent fundamental identities and that can be viewed as an 
extension of the family.37 The most intense form of human anger may be elicited when 
members of one's family are physically attacked, especially when they are perceived as 
being attacked by a rival or enemy family. Such feelings form quickly in situations of 
ethnic conflict. Family feelings also add to the intensity of emerging conflict from 
another perspective. To a limited extent the breakup of Canada can be conceived as a 
divorce. Although feelings of attachment by Quebec's francophones have no doubt 
waned, there is a history of loyalty as well as grievance toward Canada. Similarly, 
although most anglophones and allophones have probably felt a sense of pride in the 
French dimension of Canada, many have had mixed feelings of pride, superiority and 
resentment, with resentment becoming pronounced in recent years. Just as former 
marriage partners or estranged brothers may achieve the height of hatreds, so former 
compatriots can become the bitterest of foes, whether members of the political elite or 
rank and file. The tone of some of the debate in the 1997 federal election began to hint at 
a darker long-term potential.38 It is a central thesis of this article that it takes far less than 
many suppose for these forces to be unleashed beyond the point of government, military 
and police control, particularly where these institutions are themselves confronting major 
changes, divisions and conflicts. As deteriorating events further polarize feelings and 
identities, the focus on one hated enemy camp creates a psychological intensity that may 
become almost impossible to unwind.  
The Security Forces  
There are several fundamental concerns about the role of police and military forces 
during the separation of Quebec from Canada and any dismemberment of Quebec. First, 
given the high emotions unleashed in the aftermath of a "yes" vote as well as during 
ensuing deliberations, inevitably there will be demonstrations that get out of control. It 
should be anticipated also that communal violence between crowds of opposing 
communities could ensue that requires the intervention of security forces. Also, there may 
be instances of civil disobedience, such as refusal to pay taxes or occupation of public 
buildings, that require a government response.  
No function of government is more sensitive than physical enforcement. A tax or 
regulation perceived as unjust may alienate, but a plastic bullet that blinds and deforms 
one's sister, cousin or ethnic compatriot will enrage, even if fired by mistake. Even 
restrained arrest and physical removal of defiant lawbreakers from their homes or 
businesses will infuriate. If the soldiers or police officers are from the other community, 
anger will be directed at the other side and their political and security forces. Once 
violence reaches a certain point, efforts to contain it actually contribute to escalation.  
Nothing can turn good citizens against government more quickly than military or police 
forces that overreact. Even competent performance of duty can produce casualties. Under 
the stresses of crowd and riot control, there will also be human overreaction produced by 
stress or the need to make instantaneous decisions. It can also be anticipated that there 
may be some incompetent and malicious behavior, especially after the security forces 
themselves begin taking casualties. If violence begins to escalate, it can be expected that 
individuals and small groups on both sides will attempt to elicit an overreaction by 
security forces in an effort to radicalize public opinion. Taunting and injuring members of 
the security forces requires no great finesse.  
Even mild techniques of enforcement in these circumstances are likely to infuriate 
emotionally charged demonstrators, rioters and ordinary citizens. Curfews penalize large 
populations of non-participants eager to perceive a lack of even-handedness. Plastic and 
rubber bullets sometimes kill and maim, even with newer, safer methods. Non-lethal gas 
drifts uncontrollably and can harm infants, asthmatics and the elderly. Prolonged 
confrontation virtually assures serious excess. Thirteen Northern Irish civil rights 
marchers were killed on "Bloody Sunday," 1972, by British soldiers, an event that led to 
the demise of the Northern Irish government. Furthermore, the initial violence that 
brought the British Army into the conflict in Northern Ireland resulted from teenage 
Catholics in August, 1969 throwing bottles and rocks at a scheduled Protestant parade in 
Londonderry.39  
It is probable as well that there would be at least a few acts of terrorism. It does not take 
great intellect or organization to commit outrages that incite retaliation by other 
outrageous individuals in situations of ethnic conflict. Had the Oklahoma City bombing 
been conducted by a Middle East terrorist group with clear evidence of an Iranian 
connection, the pressure on the US government to respond would have been enormous. If 
the bombing had been connected to an issue of ethnic conflict in the United States, the 
potential disruptive effect of this one act would have been enormous.  
It takes only small, isolated urban pockets or relatively few rural based paramilitaries to 
do enormous damage. It is comparatively easy to create ungovernable no-go areas in 
remote rural or dense urban areas where security forces are denied routine access. It 
would not require significant numbers of individuals in the anglophone, allophone, 
francophone or Native communities to shatter hopes of a viable Quebec and perhaps new 
Canadian state. The difficulty in containing the 1996 and 1997 narcoterrorist bombings 
by motorcycle bikers in Quebec suggests the complexity of the problem from the 
standpoints of intelligence and the coordination of police forces, which in this case were 
on peaceful terms with one another.40 In both the anglophone and francophone 
communities there are individuals with the military training and access to materials 
needed to carry out terrorist attacks.  
It should give pause that the size of the IRA in Northern Ireland at the time of the August, 
1994 ceasefire was perhaps three to four hundred members. With the support of only a 
small minority of Catholics in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the IRA has 
fought the British military (numbering at its highest level about 30,000), top-notch 
intelligence services, and Northern Irish police forces to a stalemate that has lasted more 
than a quarter of a century. Northern Ireland is only about two and a half times larger in 
area than Prince Edward Island, and less than one percent of the size of Quebec. It has a 
population of only about one million six hundred thousand people.41  
Of course, in the Northern Ireland conflict the security forces of both Britain and the 
Republic of Ireland were working in concert. It is probable that the separation of Quebec 
from Canada would produce a split in the military, with most francophone officers opting 
to be a part of Quebec. An independent Quebec would require armed forces for basic 
security such as the handling of civil unrest.42 Prior to the 1995 referendum, there were 
efforts by nationalist politicians to entice francophone military officers to opt for service 
with Quebec. Younger francophone officers would see great opportunity for promotion in 
the Quebec military, while many officers and enlisted personnel would feel great pressure 
to join their homeland's forces, both from the standpoint of personal identity as well as 
the positive pressures of family ties and the negative pressures of an unfriendly 
anglophone community.43  
Eventual conflict between reconstituted armies is not unimaginable. The contentious 
issues of Native claims and partition will be discussed below. It can be anticipated that 
both the governments of Quebec and Canada will have carefully thought out contingency 
plans for controlling key military, security and other assets. Although these endeavors 
would not rationally include physical confrontations, the potential for miscalculation 
exists. Overexuberance and misjudgment can also occur in highly tense situations where 
one side may feel compelled to intervene to protect its own citizens or property. The 
Canadian government and its personnel control many facilities within Quebec, and they 
could be removed non-violently only through mutual agreement. Clashes can quickly 
erode remaining trust and produce great public pressure for retaliation. Any ongoing 
military conflict or widespread civil violence that could not be contained would 
eventually bring international intervention, a likelihood that will be discussed below.  
The Partition Issue  
The partition issue is one of the most explosive aspects of the sovereignty project. Most 
Natives and Native groups want to remain within Canada, with some expecting the 
Canadian government to protect them from incorporation within Quebec and others 
willing undoubtedly to employ violence in their effort to remain independent of the new 
country.44 Of course, some other Canadians also insist that areas ceded to Quebec after 
confederation remain a part of Canadian territory. Although only a small fraction of the 
population of Quebec, Native groups inhabit key areas, in particular massive land areas in 
the North that are rich in resources. Furthermore, Natives have a strong moral claim as 
original inhabitants as well as legal and political resources both domestically and 
internationally.45 Recent Canadian history illustrates the potential for difficulty in the 
event Quebec moves to become independent. The rebellion by Mohawks at Oka in 1990 
constituted a major challenge to the government of Quebec as well as the federal 
government. It marked the first use of the Canadian military in a domestic rebellion since 
the troubles surrounding the FLQ crisis in 1970. So furious were some civilians at the 
Natives that rocks were thrown at Native children and the elderly, with suggestions of 
vigilante action against the Mohawks.46 Given the inability of the Quebec government to 
handle the problem at Oka, some Native groups might physically challenge a sovereign 
Quebec because of perceived weakness. Also, the difficulty government officials had in 
controlling cigarette smuggling by some Native individuals and possible links between 
Native individuals near the American border and criminal organizations in the US 
suggest the potential for traffic in arms in the event of separation.  
It is sometimes argued that francophone Quebecers would not fight and die for northern 
territories, as many see legitimacy to Native claims and are in any event isolated from 
these areas. Even the leader of the Bloc Québécois acknowledged during the 1997 
electoral campaign the possibility of negotiations over northern territories. It is also true, 
however, that there are significant economic resources in these areas and that many 
sovereigntist leaders and intellectuals have a strong commitment to preserving Quebec's 
physical boundaries.47  
A serious partition movement has arisen in southern Quebec as a consequence of the 
1995 referendum. The goal is that pro-federalist areas, including parts of Montreal and its 
suburbs, the south shore of the St. Lawrence River, federalist areas west of Montreal and 
the southern Gaspé Peninsula should remain in Canada if Quebec becomes independent. 
A core argument of this movement is that if Quebec can be partitioned away from 
Canada then Quebec itself is subject to partitioning.48 Groups such as the Equality Party 
have organized efforts toward partition both as a strategy to dissuade francophone voters 
from voting "yes" next time and also as a genuine quest to remain in Canada.49 Numerous 
local governments in anglophone areas have passed unity resolutions advocating their 
desire to remain within Canada. A May 1997 opinion poll suggests the possibility of 
some public support for partitioning even if force is necessary in the event of a unilateral 
declaration of independence by Quebec.50 Support for the idea was strongest in the west 
of Canada and weak within Quebec, even in federalist areas.51 Of course, respondents 
were answering abstract questions that would not necessarily reflect their sentiments at 
the moment of impending separation, but the poll does suggest the strength of feeling 
among those committed to Canada and the potential for radicalization in the event of a 
Quebec unilateral declaration of independence.  
There are various models for the achievement of partitioning, including plebiscites in 
ridings for the Quebec legislature as well as corridors and other techniques for connecting 
isolated areas. Analysis of the details of these proposals is beyond the scope of this 
article. The main point is that any effort to partition Quebec would be risky and difficult 
from both theoretical and practical standpoints.52 One of the difficulties with the 
dismemberment of political entities is that there are almost always minorities left 
behind.53 Many anglophones and others not part of districts voting to remain with Canada 
would be embittered, as would some francophones residing in districts choosing to 
remain with Canada. No conceivable new border could satisfy everyone unless there 
were massive population movements that would be prohibitively expensive and 
dangerous.  
In the event of the separation of Quebec from Canada, the significance of francophone 
national identity with Quebec can hardly be overstated. The controversy surrounding the 
comments of Canadian government officials raising the issue of the partition in 1996 and 
similar contention during the 1997 federal election suggest the sensitivity of this issue.54 
There would almost certainly be some violent attacks by individuals or emergent terrorist 
organizations. The same problem applies to non-francophone areas denied the right to 
remain within Canada. It is likely that individuals and latent small groups would not 
peacefully accept this outcome. In other words, after a "yes" vote the partition issue 
probably will produce violence whether Quebec is partitioned or not. The greatest level 
of violence would probably occur from partitioning, in part because it might involve 
direct confrontation between Canadian and Quebec security forces and in part because 
the large francophone majority provides a much greater population base for terrorist 
activities. On the other hand, terrorists in the other camp might find a somewhat safe 
haven across the Ontario (or even US) border, much as the IRA has had safe houses in 
the Republic of Ireland. Terrorists from either side could inflict terrible damage in 
Montreal and other urban areas.  
Prior to another referendum the encouragement of partition by the Canadian government 
might help dissuade francophone voters from voting for separation, although it could 
have the opposite effect, especially among those who do not realize that partition is a real 
possibility. In the event of a future "yes" vote, it is not necessarily wise for the Canadian 
government to support partition. To do so might unwittingly encourage Native groups to 
separate from Canada, and, perhaps, some francophones in New Brunswick, to separate 
from that province and integrate with Quebec.55 This seems highly unlikely at present, 
although it might become more attractive if the rest of Canada unravels. The greatest 
concern is the potential for violence. Yet a case for partitioning Quebec can be made 
from the standpoint of the human rights of those wanting to remain in Canada as well as a 
bargaining strategy in negotiating with Quebec after an affirmative referendum vote.56  
The position of the Quebec government is that Quebec is not divisible. While Lucien 
Bouchard has been moderate in tone, a Quebec government minister has suggested that 
the use of force to protect Quebec's territorial integrity may be necessary.57 The claim 
that borders are non-negotiable is perhaps the only prudent initial strategy for the Quebec 
government. From a political perspective any weakening on this matter would alienate 
supporters and give up a powerful bargaining chip. It may not be politically or 
ideologically feasible to agree to plebiscites even during negotiations after a "yes" vote.  
Of course, the government of Quebec may not have a choice. The demand for plebiscites 
within Quebec, and perhaps eventually in New Brunswick and other areas of Canada, 
could easily become irresistible if the governments become weakened or divided. If 
violence, economic chaos or other problems create a hostile public opinion among the 
francophone community and reduced support from the bureaucracy or security forces, a 
weakened Quebec government might have to allow plebiscites, particularly if 
international actors encourage them. Some federalist areas might unilaterally secede. 
Enforcement could become a serious problem for the government if there is widespread 
civil disobedience. Unless a government is able and willing to mount a major military 
operation and maintain an occupation force, these areas become open challenges to the 
viability of the state. Only the most cohesive, undemocratic or powerful government can 
sustain such actions. One additional difficulty to be noted is that a deteriorating civil 
order in the face of ethnic conflict typically benefits more militant political leaders. 
Moderate democrats tend to be outbid for popular support by radicals who question the 
national loyalties of pragmatists. This problem could effect either the Canadian or 
Quebec government or both, with obvious implications for escalating conflict.  
That the ethical issues for and against partition have been given little attention in this 
analysis does not suggest that they are unimportant, merely that they are beyond the 
scope of this article. Ethical and human rights arguments can be made on both sides. 
Quebec as a geographically defined entity constitutes a true homeland for the French-
speaking peoples of Quebec, and Quebec has functioned effectively as a democratic 
political system. On the other hand, it can be argued that it is people who have rights, not 
geographic pieces of land (an argument that also could be applied to Canada and other 
countries) and that, in any event, it is Quebec that has opened up the question of 
separation. There are more sophisticated arguments that might be made from political, 
legal and philosophical perspectives.58 The point is merely to acknowledge that the issue 
of partition is extraordinarily complex and problematic. It is tied to profound feelings of 
self-interest, fairness and fundamental group identity and challenges the core concepts of 
political philosophy and political science.  
Unfortunately, the settlement of this question would almost certainly include forces and 
events that may well get beyond the control of the respective governments. Already the 
polarization into two distrustful and hostile communities is well underway. The surest 
route to new borders would be massive violence and population movements, an extreme 
and rather unlikely outcome no rational individual wants. But the development of a lower 
level campaign of terrorism and communal violence that acquires an ongoing life is much 
more likely.  
THE POTENTIAL FOR ACCOMMODATION AND THE AVOIDANCE 
OF VIOLENCE 
There are several key forces that would serve as an initial restraint to violence in Quebec. 
Most basic is the powerful democratic tradition throughout Canada. One need only recall 
the public revulsion in both communities at the FLQ kidnapping and murder of Quebec 
Minister of Labour Pierre Laporte in l970. The criticism by sovereigntist leaders of 
threatening statements toward members of Quebec's minority groups by former FLQ 
member Raymond Villeneuve suggests the inherent moderation of democratic leaders 
among the francophone community.59 The unity resolutions adopted by local 
governments wanting to remain in Canada have become increasingly moderate in tone, 
and the socio-economic characteristics and age of many favoring partition suggest little 
probability of massive numbers joining in communal violence against a separating state 
or their neighbors. The deep-rooted sense of decency and fair play among the vast 
majority of all Canadians makes widespread ethnic cleansing unlikely. The dominant 
political values have been nonviolent since the Conquest, and grievances have usually 
been tolerated or challenged through peaceful means.60  
The leadership and participation of many Quebec francophones in the federal government 
as well as the existence of Canada's one million other francophones would serve as a 
counter to francophone militancy and excesses by the Quebec government. Similarly, 
anglophones outside of Quebec as well as Canadian government leaders would serve as a 
brake on excessive militancy by sectors of Quebec's anglophone community, as would 
many sectors of that community itself. In brief, external linkages would on balance serve 
to moderate overly heated confrontations. A degree of plurality within each of the major 
groups would also constitute a force for moderation in an increasingly violent 
confrontation. Francophone immigrants from the Caribbean and Africa and individuals 
within the allophone communities, for example, would be moderating influences. In the 
difficult arena of bicommunal social structure, such complexities offer important 
opportunities for moderation, provided the leaders hold democratic values.  
Although there is a real risk of confrontations between the security forces of Canada and 
Quebec, it should be emphasized that the military and police forces have generally 
functioned in democratic fashion. To be sure, there have been serious instances of abuse 
by military and police personnel, but it is unrealistic to see these forces as uncontrolled 
by constitutional principals. The leaders and officers are generally committed to 
democratic values. In 1991, General John de Chastelain, Commander of the Canadian 
Armed Forces stated that ". . . in any constitutional debate, and in any action that results, 
the role of the Armed Forces will be a silent one, and that our only involvement will be to 
assist the police and associated agencies in the maintenance of law and order, should that 
be necessary."61 Furthermore, the police forces of Canada are capable of effective, 
coordinated and restrained action as indicated in the May 1997 large-scale raid by 
Quebec police on narcoterrorists.62  
It was earlier noted that the system of federalism made the search for compromise more 
difficult and that the very existence of the province of Quebec gave sovereigntists a 
powerful mechanism with which to threaten the survival of Canada. Yet the government 
and structure of Quebec as a political system are fundamentally democratic. An irony of 
provincial recognition of ethnic minorities such as the francophones of Quebec is that 
these minorities can have the constitutional means to survive and flourish as well as the 
capacity to destroy the political union. Deny federal structures and one risks more 
extreme, violent demands for separation. Grant provincial status and one provides a 
mechanism for destroying the union. But provinces within democracies are democratic 
entities, and the processes of democracy make more difficult the employment of 
government violence and repression, whether by federal or provincial leaders.  
The Centrality of Legitimacy and Effective Planning  
It can be argued that Canada should not negotiate terms of separation prior to a future 
referendum in order not to lend unwitting support to an affirmative vote or to give 
Quebec a bargaining advantage.63 There is a broader, more important issue, however, that 
suggests the importance of coordination and temperance, without either side giving up an 
understandable desire to be in a strong bargaining position. That principal is the need to 
maintain the maximum level of legitimacy to the procedures employed in both the 
referendum and any separation processes. Given the inevitable strong pressures for civil 
disorder and terrorism in a highly charged environment of impending separation, both 
sides have a clear, powerful self-interest as well as responsibility to minimize the 
inevitable alienation that could be felt in either community.  
It is unreasonable to expect political leaders to be silent while their most cherished values 
are being threatened, whether it be Canada or a sovereign Quebec. But it is important that 
each side recognizes and be responsive to potential sources of alienation by the other. 
Often this is primarily a matter of the tone or way in which demands or comments are 
expressed. From the standpoint of the federal government, the less Quebec's 
francophones are alienated, the more likely they are to reject sovereignty. From the 
perspective of Quebec's sovereigntist leaders, the less Quebec's minorities and the 
population of the rest of Canada are alienated, the less likely separation processes will 
produce a radical reconfiguration of Quebec's borders. There are, of course, numerous 
other political, economic and social costs to radicalization and any violence that gets out 
of hand.  
To the extent possible, Canada's and Quebec's leaders could agree on the specifics of any 
referendum, including the wording as well as the percentage necessary for separation to 
proceed. Although it might be more difficult to achieve a positive result with an 
unambiguous question, the sovereignty side will gain in many ways from the standpoint 
of achieving its long-term goals. Similarly, the federal government might consider the 
possibility of specifying a simple fifty percent plus one formula. The anger produced over 
statements demanding a higher figure illustrates the intensity of this issue.64 These 
agreements need not be produced by formal meetings but instead might be the result of 
tacit or informal processes.  
With respect to partition, the key to confining violence to manageable levels and 
preventing this outcome is the perception by both major communities that the process of 
deciding to partition or not to partition Quebec is legitimate. This could be achieved by 
both governments agreeing on a formula for plebiscites that would be supervised jointly 
or by the Canadian government stating that it does not intend to pursue the goal of 
partition, either prior to a referendum or in subsequent negotiations with the Quebec 
government. The subjects of the wording of the referendum question, the required 
percentage of the vote, partition and related matters are hotly contested issues and the 
above ideas are noted merely as alternatives for consideration. Other resolutions of these 
issues are possible. Nothing will entirely legitimize the process of voting or separation for 
either side, but the more the process is perceived as minimally fair the less likely is chaos 
that could threaten the existence of both states. The avoidance of a unilateral declaration 
of independence by Quebec would be an especially positive contribution to the 
prevention of violence, an outcome to which both sides can contribute.  
Contingency planning on both sides might include mechanisms for coordinating the 
activities of the police and other security forces. This could include the sharing of 
information on potential terrorist activity. It is likely in any case that in a situation of 
divided sentiments and loyalties the protection of secret information will be difficult. 
Each side has an interest in preventing terrorism or self-serving criminal activity as well 
as communal violence that will lead to eventual casualties on both sides, including 
members of the security forces themselves. With respect to operations, there are 
numerous obvious techniques that will help defuse violence such as the decision to allow 
or request, where feasible, the other side to employ its personnel in contentious situations 
with its own ethnic group. Detailed cooperative operating procedures might be developed 
independently in advance by both sides, perhaps with informal discussions among key 
personnel of the two sides to reach understandings on major points. To be sure, none of 
this will guarantee success, and the security forces themselves may well clash given 
uncertainty, rising tempers, more militant leadership and other possible negative 
eventualities. The central point is that each side has a profound common interest in 
maintaining order and social stability and that specific actions and mechanisms can help 
maximize the potential for this result.  
International Participation and Intervention  
International representatives might be requested by the Canadian and Quebec 
governments for assistance as mediators, facilitators and coordinators, for example, in 
any partition process. In the event of excessive violence they might also be requested for 
peacekeeping duties. A highly sensitive issue concerns American involvement in these 
endeavors.65 With good reason Canadians tend to be distrustful of the motives and heavy 
handedness of American foreign policy. To be sure, there are many thoughtful, moderate 
as well as sophisticated specialists on Canada in the American foreign policy 
establishment. But the making of American foreign policy is often a highly fragmented 
undertaking with decisions made for domestic political reasons or even ignorance of the 
actual situation.66 Canadians and others are well aware of possible inappropriate 
intrusiveness by the United States government.  
Although it might be resented and resisted through diplomacy, there is little doubt that 
the United States would intervene if it felt, correctly or not, that instability on its northern 
border threatened its own security. Such intervention would also occur if political 
pressures from within the American government or from interest groups or a national 
press newly interested in Canada were to compel involvement. Whatever the ethical 
questions surrounding the issue of intervention, the reality is that that the United States 
will maintain a cold and hard eye on the evolving situation. This reality makes it all the 
more imperative that leaders of Canada and Quebec follow policies that will be perceived 
as legitimate by both federalists and sovereigntists, and that there be as much 
coordination, cooperation and planning as is politically feasible. On the other hand, if 
violence becomes uncontrollable, leaders in both Canada and Quebec might reluctantly 
support or even request such American intervention.  
It is probable that any international peacekeepers or mediators in the face of violence 
would be concerned foremost with the need to establish stability. Although probably 
disposed initially to the maintenance of Quebec's borders, the over-riding goal would be 
near-term stability. The question of what would happen to Quebec's borders is 
unpredictable and would depend in large measure on the circumstances as well as the 
entities and personalities involved at that point, whether on the Canadian and Quebec or 
the international side.  
Constitutional Reform and Integrated Political Structures  
The chances of constitutional change at present appear to be negligible. English-speaking 
Canada is fed up and exhausted, and there is little enthusiasm for concessions to Quebec. 
Polls show little enthusiasm for yet another drawn-out constitutional process to appease 
francophone Quebecers, who are often perceived as unreasonable.67 For many 
francophone leaders and citizens of Quebec constitutional reform is no longer enough. 
Sovereigntists opposed to reconciliation see little hope that the rest of Canada would be 
reasonable and fair. Failure to achieve separation would be seen as a major lost 
opportunity for sovereignty.  
Yet a variety of circumstances, such as a common domestic crisis, might emerge that 
could provide a small opening. A borderline "yes" vote in any forthcoming referendum 
might serve a similar function. Constitutional changes might not have to be too radical. 
There would have to be some concession to the desire that Quebec be recognized as a 
distinct society. This is, of course, a highly sensitive and complex issue, but there are 
undoubtedly ways of accommodating the matter to make it politically acceptable to all 
sides.68 Although the constitution would have to acknowledge Native peoples, perhaps as 
original inhabitants, it could also acknowledge Quebec's francophones as one of the two 
founding peoples. This would certainly be no panacea, but it could help enable Quebec's 
francophone political leaders to claim a greater measure of acceptance from the rest of 
Canada and partially relieve the sense of injustice that was greatly magnified by the 
failure of the Meech Lake agreement. It seems clear that the rest of Canada would not 
accept significant, unique powers being awarded to Quebec alone. But granting greater 
control of some policy areas, while retaining necessary constitutional guarantees for 
minorities could be given to all provinces. Undoubtedly some concessions to Quebec 
could be made, while respecting the principal that Quebec not be singled out for special 
power and privilege on major issues. Already, there has been growing sentiment in favor 
of decentralization among key sectors of Canadian politics, such as the Reform Party, and 
budgetary and fiscal restraints have compelled the federal government to undertake 
substantial retrenchment.  
Of course, attempts at constitutional accommodation could fail again. Public opinion in 
the rest of Canada is not sympathetic to concessions, and provincial leaders would have 
to display significant leadership. The willingness of both leaders and the electorate to 
accept change is especially problematic in the West and in Quebec. Although a true 
sovereigntist, Lucien Bouchard's past flexibility suggests that he might be willing to 
compromise.69 His leadership abilities and stature among francophones might enable him 
to contribute to the development of a more modest compromise than many sovereigntist 
elites might like, although his maneuvering room would not be great given the strong 
views of the more separatist wing of the Parti Québécois. Statesmanship on all sides 
would be the key to a successful outcome. Another possible positive force could be 
Reform Party leader Preston Manning. However much Quebec's francophones and 
moderates throughout Canada may disparage him, certain aspects of his positions, such as 
the need for further decentralization, might open a small window of opportunity at some 
future point. Having the more extreme parties to the dispute agree on key elements of a 
settlement could have a significant legitimizing effect, much as the Republican President 
Richard Nixon's recognition of the People's Republic of China helped calm more militant 
American political and public opinion. In brief, from an international perspective the 
caliber of Canada's and Quebec's political leadership class, whether in or out of power, is 
very high and suggests a greater possibility for successfully managing change than might 
otherwise be the case.  
An accord modifying the Constitution could do a better job of providing acceptable 
political and economic links to the rest of Canada than the superstructure model advanced 
by the leaders of the sovereigntist parties.70 For several reasons, the political 
superstructure model is probably not workable. The problems of bicommunal structure 
have already been discussed, especially the absence of any possible coalition shifts. The 
superstructure model, even if it could be achieved, probably would fail to satisfy the 
long-term wishes of Quebec's francophones who want significant ties to the rest of 
Canada. The key stumbling block to the superstructure plan is that the Canadian 
government and people probably would reject the idea, despite the shock of a "yes" vote 
and the grave uncertainties over Canada's future. Given its much larger population the 
rest of Canada would be unwilling to accept a system of equal voting or probably even 
weighted voting on key issues.71 With the clear inevitability of Quebec sovereignty, the 
country as it exists today will have been destroyed, and the profound incentives to save it 
that could compel a constitutional compromise would not exist. Some forms of economic 
and administrative cooperation would be accepted, but they would probably be far below 
the level of the significant ties proposed by Quebec's nationalist leaders. In the event 
constitutional revision cannot be achieved, interim structures and mechanisms of 
coordination would have to be established until more permanent institutions could be 
agreed upon and implemented. At this point there would be an extraordinary incentive for 
Quebec to be conciliatory, given, among other things, the fragility of its borders.  
If a future referendum vote were negative, the federal government side would have a 
similarly strong incentive to be conciliatory. Many sovereigntists would have a sense of 
despair, as hope of independence might seem to some as lost forever. Even though the 
non-sovereigntist Canadian public would be exhausted and angry, it is important that the 
more militant nationalists believe that there is some hope of future sovereignty through 
democratic processes. Calls for a permanent end to the goal of secession seem 
unwittingly counter-productive as radicals might consider the only alternative to be a 
violent attack upon the state. It is probable that any future FLQ type of movement would 
have greater firepower and destructive capacity owning in part to readily available 
improvements in terrorist technology. Such violence would threaten the democratic 
governments of both Quebec and Canada.  
CONCLUSION 
The overlying bicommunal social structures of both Canada and Quebec intensify 
political conflict and make its resolution more difficult. The psychological impact of one 
perceived hostile group facilitates polarization, complicates the search for a settlement 
and increases the risk of violence that becomes uncontrollable. If there is an affirmative 
vote in any future referendum on the sovereignty of Quebec, the risk of significant levels 
of violence is far greater than most political leaders and policy analysts may realize. 
Many observers correctly note the multicultural dimensions to Canadian and Quebec 
society as well as the overall democratic political culture and history of Canada. What 
tends to be underrated, however, are the particular dynamics of ethnic and nationalist 
conflict and the potential for much more intense polarization that make these issues 
particularly volatile and subject to uncontrollable escalation. Several specific problems, 
such as the question of Native areas, the break up of the military and the development of 
a serious partitionist movement within Quebec, greatly increase the risk of violence in the 
event of an eventual vote for sovereignty. The volatile political emotions and forces 
unleashed make any outcome highly unpredictable, and there is risk of significant 
violence as well as the dismemberment of Quebec and break up of the rest of Canada.  
It may be of little comfort that domestic commitment to human values and international 
realities ensure that Quebec will never become another Bosnia. During separation 
processes the probabilities are that the governments of Canada and Quebec will have to 
deal with violence that has the potential to fragment each state and guarantee that neither 
for decades achieves the level of stability and prosperity that its citizens deserve. At the 
point of any affirmative referendum vote an optimal mechanism that also poses the least 
risk is surely reform within the present constitutional structure, even though this option 
may have only a small possibility of success. In any event, the leaders of the two sides 
have powerful incentives to keep the processes as legitimate as possible in the eyes of 
both communities and to work jointly to contain violence of whatever type in a manner 
most likely to prevent a backlash that gets out of control. However angry political elites 
might have become and however militant minority parties and organizations might sound, 
all democratic political leaders of Canada and Quebec have powerful incentives to be as 
low-key and accommodationist as possible. However strong and understandable feelings 
of rejection and injustice in the respective camps might be, the structural logic of their 
positions argues strongly for moderation, flexibility and perhaps even reconsideration on 
all sides.  
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